

MIND-BODY DUALISM:
A NEO-LEIBNIZIAN
ARGUMENT

An Undergraduate Honors Project Presented

By

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To

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
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An Honors Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for Honors
in
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Abstract

This paper attempts to construct a novel argument against the theory of materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Specifically, I argue that materialism cannot be a sufficient answer to the mind-body problem. That is, in the attempt to provide a satisfactory answer as to how the mind is related to the body, the claim that the mind is identical to the brain, I contend, is untenable. First, I explicate the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, then I use it to demonstrate the falsity of the claim: the mind = the brain. In doing so, I argue that *the mind and the brain do not have the same properties* in virtue of what I've deemed a "neo-Leibnizian" argument. This argument hinges on the fact that subjective experiences of the mind cannot be found in the physical brain via third-party observation, as Leibniz claimed. I then address some immediate materialist objections concerning denoting identicals. I finish with an argument that the physical must be third-personally observable. I conclude that this argument leaves the materialist in a position where she must either deny materialism outright and/or nullify her possibly scientific motivations for being a materialist.

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Introduction

The way we envisage the mind as it relates to the body is incredibly important for how we think about ourselves, our minds' relation to other minds, the physical world, and many other topics in philosophy as well as science and theology. And yet, despite these topics' philosophical exploration since time immemorial, it is still neither obvious nor clear how the mind is related to the body. This is the famous mind-body problem. Consciousness is paradoxical by nature; we know consciousness more intimately than anything else in the world, but when it comes to explicating it, we find ourselves at pains to come up with any remotely satisfactory answers.

10 In our current zeitgeist, terms like “artificial minds,” the technique of “mindfulness,” and the concept of “mental health” all presuppose that we have a grasp of that which the world has never had a complete understanding of: *the mind itself*. In psychology and neuroscience, “mind” is frequently identified as, and equivocated with, “brain,” thus, the words are often used interchangeably; in Philosophy of Mind, a similar position to this, where the mind and the brain are not distinguishable, is called *materialism*.¹ On the other side of the coin, since the beginning of recorded physiological history, the possibility of a brain-independent mind has been an attractive theory and some use “mind” interchangeably with “soul” or “spirit.” This conception of mind, as a mental substance which exists independently from bodily or material substance, is called *substance dualism* or *Cartesian dualism*, after its most noteworthy proponent, René
20 Descartes.²

My contention is that the mind actually fits somewhere in between these two radically polar theories. I will argue that the mind is, indeed, distinct from the brain and its activities, but

¹ Also commonly called *physicalism*. “Physicalism” by Daniel Stoljar, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

² “Dualism and Mine” Sections 2 and 3 by Scott Calef, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

while I find substance dualism implausible, I will not argue against it here because I do not find it entirely impossible. In Philosophy of Mind, the idea that there are both physical properties of the brain and distinct properties of the mind fits under the large umbrella-term *property dualism*.³

In this paper, I will put forth a Leibnizian⁴ argument against materialism, viz., that mental properties are distinct from the material properties of the brain by virtue of subjective experience. More specifically, I will argue that if materialism were true, we should be able to observe these mental properties as readily as we can observe the brain's physical properties, however, I ultimately contend that this is not the case and thus, materialism is not a satisfactory answer to the mind-body problem.

What is Materialism?

In this section, I will set out to comprehensively define materialism as it pertains to Philosophy of Mind. I will then present an initial reason, given the definition, to begin doubting the tenability of materialism as a satisfactory answer to the mind-body problem. By the end of this section, we should have a good grasp on the materialist theory and preliminary reasons to think that it is unsound.

What I will be arguing against here is *token materialism*⁵, the theory that, as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “For every actual particular (object, event or process) x , there is some physical particular y such that $x = y$ ” (Stoljar 2001).

³ “Dualism and Mind” Section 6 by Scott Cafef, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

⁴ Specifically, drawing on Leibniz's “machine” example in the *Monadology*, ¶ 17.

⁵ Derived from *token physicalism*, which, for my present purposes, can be interchanged with type materialism.

The juxtaposed materialist theory to this is *type materialism*: “For every actually instantiated mental property F , there is some physical property G such that $F=G$ ” (Stoljar 2001).

Since it is not the target of my paper, I will not spend much time on type materialism except to say that the reason I’m not arguing against it is that token materialists can reliably deny type materialism whereas type materialism *entails* token materialism. The instantiated properties (per type materialism) of the “actual particular” and the “physical particular” do not matter if token materialism isn’t true. That is, if we can prove that for some actual particular x , there is *not* necessarily some physical particular y such that $x = y$, by *modus tollens*, if token materialism is
50 false, then so is type materialism.

Our definition of materialism, as token materialism, entails that, in regards to the experience of pain, for example, there is some purely physical particular such that the subjective experience of that pain is *entirely equal* to whatever is happening coincidentally in the brain.

If we follow this line of thought that: 1) when you experience a certain pain, there is a particular physical event—say neuron A transmitting chemical B —and 2) that the pain and the neuronal transmission are *identical*, then we can begin to form some consequent materialist conclusions. One necessary conclusion is that, since neuronal transmission is a physical event, and physical events have physical properties, and since pain is *equal* to the physical event, then whatever property of pain you experience (sharpness, dullness, stabbing, etc.) is actually just a
60 property of a physical event.⁶

⁶ It is important to note that I am not begging the question of the truth of property dualism here since I am only arguing against materialism and not for property dualism. Both materialists and dualists would agree that there are different types and characteristics (properties) of pains, the difference is that materialists would accept the validity of the above conclusion and dualists would not.

This conclusion implies that all of subjective experience or consciousness is *exhaustively* physical, viz., that there exists *some physical component* within everything that happens in your subjective experience (henceforth “Mind”). This is what I will take primary issue with—this picture of what Mind *is*, I will argue, is not compatible with reality.

The way in which I define identity plays a crucial role in this argument. Recall from above and keep in mind that what “identity” means to the materialist is that Mind is the same particular object as the brain.

The ink making up this sentence is identical to the ink making up this sentence. That is an example of *strict identity* or *numerical identity* where something can be called identical if and
70 only if it is uniquely identical to itself; $A = A$ and $A \neq S(\text{not } A)$. Strict and numerical identity are also not reserved to only those particulars denoted by the same term such as “A.”

Thus, materialists say that “Mind” is equal, identical to, indistinct from (among other variations) “the brain,” viz., that whatever is denoted by the term, “the brain” is the *exact same thing in every way* as whatever is denoted by the term, “Mind” (or “subjective experience” as I’ve put it.) Per this line of thought, the brain and Mind are strictly, numerically identical—using the different terms, the materialist might add, is simply making a distinction without a difference.⁷

Now, the materialist claim regarding identity is what I will argue is particularly problematic for materialism. I will attempt to argue in the next two sections that the principle of

⁷ This discussion of identity is not concerned with the controversial positions surrounding the *language of identity*, but rather with the “unproblematic notion” given by Curtis and Noonan: “[An] increasingly popular view [regarding identity] is the one advocated by [David] Lewis: although the debates make sense they cannot genuinely be debates about identity, since there are no philosophical problems about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion. What there are, are genuine problems which can be stated using the language of identity. But since these can be restated without the language of identity they are not problems about identity.”

80 the Indiscernibility of Identicals in tandem with a Leibnizian argument for the existence of mental properties leads us to conclude that the brain is, in fact, *not* identical to Mind.

The Indiscernibility of Identicals

If the brain and Mind are identical, then every property of the brain is also a property of Mind and vice versa. Metaphysically, if the brain and Mind are identical, then they must share all of the same properties.

This basic idea makes at least intuitive sense: if x and y are numerically identical, then they are just *one thing*, there is no property that x has and that y does not have. This is a very
 90 basic instance of the principle known as the *Indiscernibility of Identicals*. It is a rather uncontroversial metaphysical principle and is entirely consequential to the materialist claim that the brain is identical to Mind. Logically, it is formulated as:

$$x = y \rightarrow \forall F(Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)$$

That is, if x is identical to y , then for every property F , object x has F if and only if object y has F . I will lay out two cases which will explicate this principle's metaphysical consequences.

Case 1:

If I intend to assert that the book sitting next to me (x) is identical to the book that is sitting to my right (y), then I must also accept, as a logical consequence, that for
 100 any and every property, say (*is entitled* *Leaves of Grass*), the book sitting next to me is entitled *Leaves of Grass* if and only if the book sitting to my right is entitled

Leaves of Grass. If the books are, in fact, identical, then every property—color, weight, page number—is *necessarily* a property of both denotations x and y .

So, in Case 1, the terms x and y are simply two denotations for one referent: the singular book, *Leaves of Grass*. My argument ultimately rests on the antithetical case to Case 1 (which we'll creatively dub "Case 2"), where the Indiscernibility of Identicals shows that the two terms x and y are shown to denote two distinct referents.

Case 2:

If I again assert that x and y are identical, if x has 913 pages (a property of the book) and y has 914 pages, then by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, $x \neq y$.⁹

Why? Because for at least the property (*has 913 pages*) that x has this property but y does not.

So, there exists some property F such that x has F or y has F , but not both:

$$2.1 \quad \exists F(Fx \oplus Fy)$$

Thus, here it is *not* the case that "for every property F , object x has F if and only if object y has F :"

$$2.2 \quad \neg (\forall F)(Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)$$

Therefore, by *modus tollens*,¹⁰ if the above case is true, then it is not the case that x is identical to y :

⁹ Barring the fact that different editions might have different page numbers. Here, I am denoting one, single book using different descriptors.

¹⁰ The rule of logic which states that if a conditional statement (if x then y) is accepted, and the consequent does not hold (not y), then one can infer the negation of the antecedent (not x).

2.3 $\neg (x = y)$ or $x \neq y$

In this case, the book sitting next to me (x) and the book sitting to my right (y) cannot be identical; they are discernable by at least one property (having or not having 913 pages).

The logic and metaphysics behind all of this are relatively uncontroversial between materialists and non-materialists alike. The reason I lay it out in plain sight here is that I intend to argue that materialism is not true because, per this principle, the brain cannot be identical to Mind. This argument ultimately plays out as Case 2 does. I will argue there is some property that Mind has which the brain does not, and thus, by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the claim that the brain = Mind is not true.

In the next section I will give reasons to believe that Mind has at least one property that is not shared by the brain. A sensory experiential property such as, say, the feeling of silk, is one such property that, as we will see, is a property of Mind but is not a property of the brain.

The Problem of Third-Party Observation

As early as the 18th century, compelling arguments against materialism were being made. In 1714, Gottfried Leibniz wrote:

Imagine there were a machine whose *structure* produced thought, feeling, and perception; we can conceive of its being enlarged while maintaining the same relative proportions among its parts, so that we could walk into it...Suppose we do walk into it; all we would find there are cogs and

levers and so on pushing one another, and never anything to account for a perception.¹¹ (“Monadology”)

What he is basically saying here is that, within physical machinery such as the brain, upon observation, one can find every component part working away, but nowhere in it can one find subjective experiences. As Leibniz posited, if indeed subjective experiences are properties of the physical brain, we should be able to find them by observing the brain, just as we can find all other properties of the brain. This is a fundamental problem for materialism, and it is what I will call the Problem of Third-Party Observation which I will expound upon in this section.

The Problem of Third-Party Observation for materialism is essentially the idea that if
 150 Mind and the brain are identical and physical, they and their properties should be able to be observed third-personally. As I will explain, Mind as subjective experience *cannot* be observed third-personally, whereas the entire physical brain as a biological organ (where biology is supervenient upon physics) *can* be observed physically. Let’s examine this concept with a real-world example:

Imagine the feeling of touching silk, that is, *what it is like* to you, within your conscious awareness, to feel silk. Now picture yourself in a neurologist’s office and she is examining your brain while you are experiencing the feeling of silk. She is using the latest tools and the newest brain-imaging technology—in fact, she is using the *best* brain imaging technology that is physically possible. No matter what she is observing on the computers, in the images, even in a

¹¹ His conclusion drawn from the Problem of Third-Party Observation was that a substance of some sort must produce perception, which does not logically follow from his above argument. The analogy is still appropriate, however for driving a wedge between the brain and Mind, which is of course not at odds with my argument.

160 virtual reality machine, she cannot possibly observe the actual *feeling*—the feeling of silk, or the “what-it’s-like” to feel silk in this moment.¹²

Can the neurologist see brain activity in an fMRI scan when she asks you to feel silk? She can, but of course what she’s seeing is not *the feeling of silk*—that doesn’t seem to make sense. What if she steps into some virtual reality machine that takes your brain activity and ostensibly replicates it, neuron for neuron, in her brain? In that situation, it *seems* like the neurologist is getting closer, but this is not the case: she is only observing *her* experience of the feeling of silk, as *she* feels it, provided to her by the machine. Thus, the neurologist, in her attempt to finally observe Mind third-personally is stuck experiencing Mind first-personally.¹³

170 Undoubtedly there are certain characteristics about the feeling of silk. Yet, it seems bizarre to imagine explaining exactly what the characteristics of this feeling are to anyone. These feelings are called “mental phenomena” or “qualia.” One can do this same test for the smell of chocolate or the sight of green or the feeling of heat: there is a *quality* to this feeling but there’s no way to describe it in words other than those comparing it to *other* feelings; this naturally leads to the unappealing explanation: “It just feels like what it feels like.”

Equally untenable is the idea that any other person besides you could look at your brain, in any capacity, and “see” or “feel” the same qualia that you are seeing or feeling. It seems that

¹² Understanding the “what-it’s-like” as a property of subjective experience is crucial to understanding this argument. This “what-it’s-like” to feel silk would be *essential* in nature and indescribable without evoking other similar feelings. One cannot, for example, get someone unacquainted with the feeling of silk to know how it feels by saying, “It is soft, smooth, etc.” An attempt to explain a conscious feeling exhaustively by evoking other feelings is not possible—it would result only in the frustrated, circular explanation, “It just feels like silk.”

¹³ One can imagine how this particular example might lead to a rather comical infinite regress of neurologists taking part in this experiment only to result in an infinite number of neurologists experiencing subjective experience first-personally as they try to experience their subjects’ third-person experiences first-personally. So too with the third, fourth, fifth...and nth neurologist would this result be the same.

in every conceivable case, the neurologist cannot possibly observe these phenomena by observing your brain.

180 So, the Problem of Third-Party observation for materialism is this: if the subjective experience of feeling silk is solely physical, we should be able to observe it physically, presumably in the brain, just like we can observe any other physical particular.

The most obvious objection at this point is, as a materialist might posit, “But we *can* observe the subjective experience because the activity in the brain is *identical* to the subjective experience of feeling silk!” This objection is worthy of consideration because it is, in fact, the principle assertion that materialists make regarding the difference between Mind and the brain: that there is no distinction, or rather that the only distinction that we make is between what exactly we’re calling this singular object.

190 We can exemplify this objection in terms of a somewhat well-known thought experiment involving Superman and Clark Kent. The idea goes as follows: If the Superman stories were true, then Clark Kent = Superman. These *names* have identical *referents*, that is, they are both referring to the particular man, Clark Kent/Superman.

When the aforementioned materialist says, “But we *can* observe the subjective experience because the activity in the brain is *identical* to the subjective experience of feeling silk!” she might be tempted to substitute the Clark and Superman variables with Mind and the brain, saying something like, “Mind = the brain. These two different *names* have identical *referents*: the organ in your skull and its physical processes, respectively. Dualism is incorrect because it incorrectly assumes that, because the two different names might *seem* to have different referents (just as one might suppose that referring to the man, Clark Kent, is different from

referring to the man, Superman, because they *seem* to be two different people), then Mind and
200 the brain must be different.”

To fully consider this response, and to see why it ultimately does not help materialism, I will elaborate on this objection by introducing another character, Lois Lane, then it will become clear as to why making the above analogy, as an objection to the Problem of Third-Party Observation, is ultimately fallacious.

The Lois Lane Objection

The Lois Lane Objection is essentially this: Assuming the Superman comics are true, Lois Lane believes that Superman is strong, so superhuman strength is a property that Superman
210 has. She also doesn't (or wouldn't, if asked) believe that Clark Kent is unaccountably strong. Thus, she is wrong in her belief that Clark Kent is not strong, but it's not by any fault of her own. She is only wrong in her belief because Clark Kent *is* Superman, and her belief is predicated upon ignorance of this fact; ignorance of some critical fact about the subject to which you are referring cannot possibly produce a correct belief about such a fact, after all. If she knew that Clark Kent = Superman (as the man, a referent object), she would believe that Clark Kent did, in fact, have superhuman strength; she would believe he possessed a specific property that she thought he lacked before she knew Clark Kent was numerically identical to Superman.

In the same vein, the objector continues, non-materialists say that in Mind, there can exist “the feeling of silk,” so, such a feeling is a *property* that Mind has. They also say that in the
220 brain, there cannot be “the feeling of silk.” But, they are wrong in this latter belief for the same reason that Lois Lane was wrong in her belief that Clark Kent was not strong. The objector says

that non-materialists are wrong because they are ignorant of the fact that Mind *is* the brain. She would say that when non-materialists talk about Mind, they are essentially talking about Clark Kent (per the analogy) and attributing properties to it (namely, qualitative experience) and wrongly excluding those properties from the brain. Clearly, they are making the same mistake as one who might attribute properties to Superman (capacity to lift cars with one arm) and wrongly excludes those properties from Clark Kent.

230 The problem with using this analogy, as it relates to Mind and the brain, is that it is a false analogy; it does not correctly map on to what non-materialists are doing when attributing properties to Mind that, I argue, exist over and above properties of the brain. If Lois could, in fact, know *every physical thing* there is to know about the man she calls Clark Kent, she would learn that “Clark Kent” and “Superman” are just two denotations of a singular referent—this is not true about “Mind” and “the brain.”

I will argue in the next section that if we knew every physical fact about the brain’s most intricate workings, we *should* know what the subjective experience of that brain’s subject consists of in each moment. Only if the experience of feeling silk is the *same exact thing* as neuron A transmitting chemical B would the analogy work and the materialist objection stand. Since, I argue, we *cannot* observe the actual experience of feeling silk by observing some such neuronal transmission (or even by knowing the physics of neurology exhaustively), we cannot
240 say that they are the same token action or state and therefore cannot say that, when talking of Mind and the brain as distinct entities, processes, states, etc., we are, as the objector argues, simply ignorant of the reality that the two are one and the same. Thus, the objection has not saved materialism.

This raises a lingering question in light of my counter-objection above: “Why should everything physical be required to be third-personally observable?”

The Physical Must be Third-Personally Observable

To address this question, we need a strict definition of both “physical” and “third-personally observable.” I will first define “third-personally observable” as: able to be directly and empirically observable. That is, if Gerald is directly observing a blade of grass, for example, Steve can join him and directly observe the same blade of grass. Empirically, they can adjudicate the blade’s properties (or essence, being, etc.) and can, in principle, come to a consensus by which they can both describe the blade of grass in such a way that both of their observations can be elucidated so as to be understandable by any third-party.

This definition precludes observations of *brain events* (which can be gathered with fMRI scans) from being actual observations of subjective, *mental events* because multiple people cannot directly and empirically observe the subject’s sensory experience via brain scan.¹⁴ However, by materialist thought, the latter events should, in fact, be third-personally observable. Thus, we only need to see if a satisfactory definition of “physical” can help unpack the materialist’s question above and then proceed to answer it.

I will assume Stoljar’s definition of “physical” as it pertains to “physical properties” from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

¹⁴ This argument is not reserved strictly for fMRI or any other technology we currently have. Though I won’t address it here, it may be tempting to evoke an objection along the lines of Patricia Churchland’s argument regarding technological limitations in her essay, “The Hornswoggle Problem.” The infinite regress of brain-observing scientists implied in Section II ¶ 5 above would serve as a short response to Churchland.

Mind-Body Dualism: A Neo-Leibnizian Argument

[1] A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else [2] is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents. (Stoljar)

For clarity's sake, since the definition assumes that there exist physical objects insofar as they have the physical properties as defined above, I too will assume that there exist physical objects. So, back to the question at hand: why should everything physical be third-personally observable?

Well, the physical is, in principal, concrete, substantial, empirical, and spatio-temporally located.¹⁶ All of these properties (concreteness, substantiveness, etc.) are not only the “[sorts] of properties required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects;” they are also precisely the kinds of properties that make up the realm of what should be third-personally observable by their very nature.

For example, the brain and its properties are certainly third-personally observable. As objects, it and its constituent parts require that they retain the properties of being concrete, substantial, empirical, and spatio-temporally located; by its very nature, the brain, or any

¹⁶ This is assumed by all accounts of contemporary physics. Known quantum effects such as entanglement, nonlocality, etc. still presume that a physical particular, however currently immeasurable, still, in principle, retain these properties. “Action at a distance,” for example, not least by its very name, suggests spatio-temporal location as a property of physical particulars acting or being acted upon; even if those particulars are located in two places or two times seemingly at once, they retain spatio-temporally location as a property.

physical object, *could not dispossess any one of these properties and still be third-personally observable.*

Materialists assume, or at least take as motivation for their arguments, the claim that the kinds of things posited by the empirical sciences are the kinds of things we should believe exist. That is, materialist metaphysical argumentation is bound to whatever science posits—materialist ontology is nearly (if not entirely) congruent with scientific ontology. Thus, if a materialist were to grant that there exist some physical objects that are not third-personally observable, her ontology would immediately extend outside of what science posits as truth. Why? Because science *relies on, and is restricted by, third-person observability* as a matter of procedure.

290 Suppose a materialist accepts the conclusion that subjective experience exists, yet is not third-personally observable. Then, this move would have to disavow her of the idea that science is the official arbiter of what is and isn't physical and what does and doesn't exist. Any scientific motivations for materialism are then nullified. That is, if science's ontology principally informs a materialist's ontology, and if that materialist accepts a conclusion that is neither informed by science's ontology nor is achieved by scientific procedure (third-party observation, specifically), then her ontology is no longer informed by science. Thus, science can no longer reasonably be used as her motivation or reason for believing that materialism is true or even that it is the best starting point for examining the mind-body problem.¹⁷

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¹⁷ One should note that I am not impugning science in any way here; the scientific endeavor is an important one. I am simply arguing that the following is not a sound line of reasoning: Metaphysical ontology is inextricable from scientific ontology, therefore, there is no such thing as a sound metaphysical argument that does not fit within a scientific framework.

Conclusion

I'll conclude here by briefly summing up what I have argued in this paper, then I will briefly touch on some further areas of inquiry on the matter of Mind.

I began by arguing that materialism entails strict, numerical identity between the brain and Mind (which I use interchangeably with "subjective experience.") I then set out to argue that the Indiscernibility of Identicals logically binds us to accept that if Mind = the brain, then they have all of the same properties, but that if I can argue that they do *not* have all of the same
310 properties, the Indiscernibility of Identicals would logically entail that Mind \neq the brain. In the next section I set out to argue that Mind has at least one property that the brain does not, namely any sensory-experiential property. I argued that the brain does not have these properties in virtue of the fact that these properties are not third-personally observable.

Then, in the same section, I addressed the first objection that may have arisen at that point: that the non-materialist is simply mistaken in believing that Mind and brain don't have the same properties because, though they are numerically identical, they just appear distinct. I used the analogy to Clark Kent and Superman with Mind and the brain to exemplify this objection. In the next section, I set out to give a counter-objection by expanding on the analogy; I argued that someone, such as Lois Lane, could, in principle, third-personally observe the man Clark
320 Kent/Superman and find out that they were the same person. Since this is not true of Mind and the brain, the analogy, I concluded, is not, in fact, an appropriate analogy and thus does not make the objection discrediting to the argument.

In the final section, I gave an argument that the physical must be third-personally observable. This premise is important because it is consequential to my previous arguments that there exist properties which are not third-personally observable and thus not physical (since the physical, I argued, must be third-personally observable.) I then posited that, given my argument, a materialist might be tempted to accept that there exists *something* that is not third-personally observable, but that this move would disavow any motivations from science for believing materialism is true as its methodology and ontology relies on third-party observation.

330 The natural question that arises when one accepts that materialism is untenable is, “What are the alternatives?” In the introduction, I briefly introduced the different species of dualism, many subspecies of which are reasonable alternatives to materialism given that they acknowledge subjective experience and discern it from brain function.

In recent years, perhaps beginning with David Chalmers’ groundbreaking work, *The Conscious Mind*, there have arisen numerous interesting non-materialist theories of why we possess consciousness (as subjective experience) which are compatible—to differing degrees—with both substance dualism and property dualism, though none of which have yet to stand out so prominently as to become ascendant dualist theories in Philosophy of Mind. Yet, they remain nascent possibilities for further research.

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Appendix

Below are some suggestions for further reading on this topic that were of great influence to me in preparing to write this thesis and which further explore the mind-body problem:

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